Does the Bolsa Família Program influence votes in Brazil?

Responsible researcher: Angelo Cruz do Nascimento Varella

Article title: WHEN PAYOUTS PAY OFF: CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFERS AND VOTING BEHAVIOR IN BRAZIL 2002-10

Author of the article: Cesar Zucco Jr.

Location of intervention: Brazil

Sample size: 4 electoral cycles in all Brazilian municipalities

Sector: Economic Policy and Governance

Type of Intervention: Effects of the Bolsa Família Program on Brazilian elections

Variable of main interest: Proportion of votes according to the Bolsa Família Program

Assessment method: Others

Policy Problem

In Brazil, some of the public policies with the greatest social impact are the Conditional Income Transfer Programs (PCTR). Such initiatives make it possible to encourage good practices in society simultaneously with the redistribution of wealth, resulting in families from lower socioeconomic classes benefiting widely, generating a reduction in poverty and an increase in social well-being. In Brazil, the Bolsa Família Program (PBF) is, at the time of this study, the largest program of its kind, making it a recurring object of scientific studies about its effects and consequences.

One of the most relevant issues surrounding the Bolsa Família Program is its possible electoral influence, especially in the case of benefiting families. As it is a broad and highly popular program, researchers question whether the existence of this type of public policy is capable of causing interference in the decision-making process of citizens, generating clientelism that has the potential to affect elections.

Implementation and Evaluation Context

It is possible to argue that PCTR characterize one of the types of social public policies with the greatest adherence and growth in developing countries. In 1995, two Brazilian cities, Brasília and Campinas, implemented cash payments to low-income families in accordance with a series of conditions proposed by local governments, the most important of which were ensuring their children's school attendance and frequent medical appointments. specific, for prevention purposes.

Since then, dozens of other countries have instituted versions of PCTR, so that nationwide initiatives, such as the Brazilian case of the PBF and the Mexican case of the “Progressa” program, serve millions of people in their respective countries, becoming central pillars in their social assistance systems.

Since research indicates that the economic condition affects the electoral results of a region, academics have become interested in analyzing the influence that such welfare public policies have on the democracies that adopt them. Other studies carried out in several countries, such as Germany, Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay, demonstrate that the PCTR have the capacity to generate positive short-term results in elections, but there is no evidence that this trend is lasting or that it is linked to political parties who implemented them, even when the program remains in force.

Policy Details

During Fernando Henrique Cardoso's presidency, Brazil already had several PCTRs established. In 1996, the government began such a pilot program to remove children working in coal industries, later expanding the initiative to mitigate other forms of child labor. In 1997, the government started the program which, in 2001, became Bolsa Escola, with the aim of ensuring school attendance. Soon afterwards, Bolsa Alimentação was created, with conditions aimed at the health of the beneficiaries.

Even with the implementation of all these relevant social programs, Luís Inácio Lula da Silva was elected in 2002 and, the following year, created the Ministry of Social Development (MDS). This body is responsible for unifying the registration of all beneficiaries of assistance programs, called Single Registry, and sets the basis for the gradual composition of the Bolsa Família Program. In October 2006, the PBF served more than 40 million individuals, from 11 million families, which corresponds to more than 20% of the Brazilian population.

Families with a per capita income below 70 dollars per month and who have children up to 15 years old can register with the PBF. Pregnant women and extremely poor families are also eligible. Although these cases were rare, the program could pay up to 120 dollars per month at the time.

Methodology Details

The researchers used data on PBF coverage in Brazilian municipalities, as well as the amount allocated in each location, and related this information to the municipal results of the presidential elections. In this way, it is possible to determine the impact that the existence of these assistance programs has on the votes of Brazilian cities.

In total, the presidential races of 2002, 2006 and 2010 were analyzed, with the 1998 elections being used as a control parameter, since the implementation of the PCTR was not yet nationwide. The authors also used other statistical methods to ensure the validity of the proposed models.

Results

The main result found for the analyzes carried out indicates that the PBF benefits candidates who are already in power. However, it is worth noting that, as described in academic literature, this effect dissipates over time and does not necessarily benefit the creators of the legislation, often being associated with changes or integrations of existing programs. It is also worth noting that it is possible that, in elections, the simple promise to maintain or expand the PCTR is enough to garner votes.

The analysis of spending from the PBF demonstrated that, in 2002, for every 100 reais in per capita increase in spending, the vote share increased by 15 percentage points. However, in 2010, this ratio progressively fell to 6.5 percentage points. Regarding program coverage in percentage of families served, the results remained stable.

Another relevant factor in the analysis demonstrates that, despite benefiting incumbent politicians who are candidates for presidential positions, the PBF does not improve the performance of candidates for legislative positions, nor does it increase identity with specific political parties.

Public Policy Lessons

The article presents interesting results for the political scenario in Brazil. With regard to the PCTR, present in the last decades of Brazilian politics. It is possible to affirm that there is a real and observable impact of these initiatives on the presidential elections, benefiting incumbent politicians in the short term.

However, it is worth highlighting that these effects do not occur in the long term and are weakened by a series of variables, such as the willingness of opposition candidates to maintain, or even expand, the PCTR. Neither is there a partisan influence of this type of policy nor a permanent preference of voters towards the creators of such programs, so the argument that public policies such as the PBF cause clientelism are poorly supported by empirical analyses.

Finally, it is worth highlighting the social impact of these public policies. Not only does poverty effectively combat, acting proactively to redistribute income, but social well-being increases through control, monitoring and encouragement of good social practices. It is no surprise that such programs are well-received by voters, as they promote real changes. However, such measures are not enough to perpetuate voting intentions, which is, generally speaking, good news for democracy.

Reference

ZUCCO JR, Cesar. When payouts pay off: Conditional cash transfers and voting behavior in Brazil 2002–10. American journal of political science, vol. 57, no. 4, p. 810-822, 2013.