What happens when a woman wins an election in Brazil?

Responsible researcher: Viviane Pires Ribeiro

Article title : What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil

Article authors: Fernanda Brollo and Ugo Troiano

Location of intervention: Brazil

Sample size: 723 elections

Sector: Gender

Type of Intervention: Analysis of the relationship between the gender of government officials and policy results

Variable of main interest: Gender of rulers

Evaluation method: Discontinuous Regression

Assessment Context

The Brazilian federal presidential system occurs in a multi-party system context. The layers of political and administrative organization in Brazil are the federal government, the states, the federal district and the municipalities. Municipalities are smaller federative units with autonomous local government, governed by a mayor, directly elected by citizens for a four-year term, and a legislative body, also directly elected by voters.

Mayors of municipalities with more than 200,000 voters are directly elected by a second-round rule, while mayors of municipalities with fewer than 200,000 voters are directly elected by a political plurality rule. Elections for president, governors and members of Congress occur at the same time every four years, while municipal elections are staggered over two years and also occur every four years. Before 1998, Brazilian mayors could not run for re-election, but after 1998, mayors were allowed to run for a second term.

Intervention Details

Brollo and Troiano (2016) use a set of microdata from 5,567 Brazilian municipalities to analyze whether the ruler's gender affects policy results and whether men and women respond differently to local electoral incentives. To this end, the authors analyzed two terms of municipal administration in municipalities with less than 200,000 voters: 2001-2004 and 2005-2008. Thus, only disputes with two candidates of opposite genders were considered, totaling a sample of 723 elections, which represents 7% of disputes in each term. The electoral data are from the Superior Electoral Court.

The study focuses on discretionary transfers destined for infrastructure projects, which represent around 15% of total municipal infrastructure expenditure. These transfers are related to budget items that involve the construction of buildings and bridges, the paving of roads, the improvement of water and sewage systems, the purchase of ambulances, etc. Data on infrastructure transfers self-reported by the municipal administration were obtained from the National Treasury portal - FINBRA database.

To analyze health results, data from the Live Birth Information System (SINASC) were used. This dataset contains monthly information on the number of prenatal medical visits and the period of pregnancy (weeks). The variable used in the analysis is the proportion of pregnant women without prenatal medical consultations and births not considered premature (at least 37 weeks).

Data on corruption are from random audits of municipal governments. The main categories of irregularities described in the audit reports are: illegal practices in bidding; fraud; excessive billing; and embezzlement of funds. The definition of corruption is a dummy variable that indicates whether at least one episode of any of the types of irregularities was detected by auditors.

Methodology Details

To analyze the effect of municipal rulers' gender on Brazilian policy outcomes, Brollo and Troiano (2016) used a large data set in a Discontinuous Regression design of close electoral disputes.

The authors focused on policy outcomes that depended on local government effort and for which administrative data at the municipal level exist. First, they examined discretionary infrastructure transfers from the federal government, because the mayor's effort is an important determinant of the amount of transfers municipalities receive from the Union. Second, they analyzed health outcomes, focusing in particular on health services related to prenatal care. The public health system in Brazil is decentralized, expenses are mainly financed by the federal government, but municipalities are responsible for all decisions regarding resource allocation. Thus, municipal policies are an important determinant of health outcomes. Third, they analyzed gender differences in corruption, using data from random audits of municipal governments that allowed them to construct an administrative measure of corruption. Fourth, they analyzed changes in temporary employees in the public sector, since temporary hiring is an instrument of political clientelism (exchange of goods and services for political support) widely used in Brazil. Finally, they analyzed whether the decision to run for re-election and the probability of re-election differ between female mayors and mayors elected after fierce disputes between both genders.

To analyze whether local election incentives motivate candidates differently, the research focused on two heterogeneous treatment effects that can capture the incentives provided to politicians by municipal elections. First, it sought to study term limits, as the ability to run for re-election can affect the policies implemented by local politicians. Mayors in Brazil can only run for a consecutive term once, so the authors compared gender differences between mayors in their first and second terms. Secondly, it analyzed whether mayors behave differently when elections approach. Municipal elections are held every four years, so the authors sought to compare the behavioral differences of both genders between the pre-election years (the last two years of the mandate) and the non-electoral years (the first two years of the mandate).

Results

The results show that there are significant gender differences in terms of policy outcomes. Firstly, it was found that female mayors attract twice as many discretionary transfers from the federal government as male mayors. Second, the results indicate that having a female mayor leads to better health outcomes related to prenatal care. In particular, municipalities with a female mayor saw a 61% drop in the number of women without prenatal medical appointments and a 1.3% increase in the number of regular (i.e., non-premature) births. These positive effects on the health area are concentrated among mothers with less education, who depend more on public health services. Third, it was discovered that female mayors are less likely to be involved in administrative irregularities. The probability of observing an episode of corruption is lower (33% to 28%) in municipalities with female mayors than in municipalities with male mayors.

Analysis of gender differences in public employment indicates that male mayors hire around 50% more temporary employees to work directly in the municipal administration than female mayors. However, no significant differences were observed between genders when analyzing permanent civil servants. On the other hand, when analyzing re-elections, no differences were observed between genders in the probability of running for re-election. The results show, however, that female candidates elected after a contested election are less likely (50%) to be re-elected compared to their opponents.

The study suggests that politicians of both genders may respond differently to local electoral incentives. Firstly, it was found that in the first term, when they can run for re-election, mayors tend to hire more temporary employees to work directly in the municipal administration compared to female mayors. This finding suggests that male mayors may be promoting greater political sponsorship to be re-elected than female mayors. It was also observed that differences in terms of prenatal consultations between municipalities with female mayors and male mayors emerge only for politicians in their second term, which is consistent with the idea that "lame-duck" mayors may perform worse than male mayors. your opponents. Finally, it was found that mayors tend to hire more temporary civil servants (relative to female mayors) in the two years before the election, rather than in the first two years of their term.

Public Policy Lessons

Brollo and Troiano (2016) contributes to the literature that deals with female participation in politics, highlighting how local electoral incentives can affect political decisions and results in a competitive environment. Local elections can increase accountability by helping to align politicians' actions with voters' preferences, but they can also generate incentives for politicians to behave strategically. That is, the effect of local elections on politicians' behavior may differ between genders – men and women respond differently to electoral incentives.

The analysis indicates that municipalities governed by mayors receive more discretionary transfers and have better health outcomes. On the other hand, mayors tend to hire more temporary civil servants before municipal elections and are more likely to engage in corruption.

Considering that the research adopts a scenario where there is fierce electoral competition between candidates of both genders, the authors emphasize that it cannot be said that the results found also apply to a scenario with quotas reserved for women in politics. So an interesting direction for future research would be to understand whether policies aimed at increasing female participation through quotas that restrict competition between both genders have different implications than policies aimed at increasing the number of women competing in open elections.

References

BROLLO, Fernanda; TROIANO, Ugo. What happens when a woman wins an election? Evidence from close races in Brazil. Journal of Development Economics, vol. 122, p. 28-45, 2016.